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'TORTS-THE ACTION FOR LOSS OF
CONSORTIUM IN NEW MEXICO
Justice Moise, speaking for the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Roseberry v. Starkovich,1 held a wife could not recover for loss of
consortium resulting from the negligent injury of her husband by a
third party. Mr. Roseberry, a uranium miner, was crushed beneath a
large slab of rock, rendering him totally and permanently disabled by
reason of paralysis. Mrs. Roseberry was denied recovery from defendant, a fellow-employee, the mine safety director, who negligently allowed her husband to enter the mine. What are the effects
of this decision?
Consortium, in its broadest meaning, includes all incidents of the
family relationship. 2 The common law tort action for loss of consortium is founded on the relational interest between the plaintiff
and one or more third parties. The interests recognized as protectable
from interference resulting in injury or incapacity were those between husband and wife and parent and minor child. These relationships were viewed more or less like those which existed between
master, identified with the husband, and valuable, superior servants
"and thus the loss of such services became the gist of the action, and
remained indispensable to it until comparatively recent years." 3
Two types of interference with the husband-wife relationship are
recognized. Those which are intentional on the part of the tortfeasor,
i.e., criminal conversation, enticement and alienation of affections,
and those resulting from the tortfeasor's negligence. Though the
common law did not allow the wife to sue for interference with the
domestic relationship because of her inferior position as a married
woman, this impediment has been removed in the case of intentional
interference in virtually all states.4 However, no such unanimity in
equality of treatment exists for negligent interference.'
1. 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963).
2. H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations 261 (1968).
3. W. Prosser, Torts § 124, at 873 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Clark, supra note 2, at 263.
5. Several cases recognize the wife's claim for loss of consortium: See, e.g., Missouri Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Stenta v. Leblang, 55 Del. 181,
185 A.2d 759 (1962); Hightower v. Landrum, 109 Ga. App. 510, 136 S.E.2d 425 (1964);
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmidt, 248 Iowa 272, 78
N.W.2d 480 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Novak
v. Kansas City Transit Co., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of
Am., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1966); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429,397 P.2d 529 (1964);
Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Moran v. Quality Aluminum
Casting Co., 34 Wis.2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
Other cases have rejected the wife's claim for loss of consortium: See, e.g., Smith v.
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The specific elements embodied in consortium have been sum-

marized as the services of the wife, the financial support of the
husband and the variety of intangible relationships prevailing between spouses living together in a going marriage. 6 These intangibles
are usually expressed in terms of affection, society, companionship

and sexual relations.
In Roseberry, Justice Moise accepted the following definition of

consortium taken from Black's Law Dictionary: 7

Conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to
company, co-operation, affection and aid of the other in every
conjugal relation (emphasis added).
Though this may seem a simple choice among several alternative

definitions, a closer examination shows a more thoughtful decision.
The notable omission from this definition is services. The elements
included, though broad, are those generally considered non-economic
in nature. An explanation for this exclusion lies in New Mexico's

community property system.
The majority opinion in Hittafer v. Argonne Co.,8 the leading case

affording recovery to a wife for loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of her husband, asserted the absurdity of dividing consortium into services on the one hand and conjugal affection on the
other. This may be arguably so in a jurisdiction governed exclusively

by common law considerations, but not in New Mexico. This state
adheres to the rule promoted by de Funiak9 and McKay" ° who
consider the loss of an injured spouse's services a loss to the community rather than to either party individually. The recovery for such

losses belongs to the community; the husband, as its head, is the
proper party to bring the action.' '
The mitigating effect of this interpretation on the decision to deny
United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So.2d 153 (1960); Jeune v. Del E. Webb Co., 77
Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954); Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d
330 (1956); Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Miller v. Sparks, 136 Ind. App. 148,
189 N.E.2d 720 (1963); Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211 A.2d 891 (1965); Coastal
Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955); Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite
Co., 247 Minn. 515, 77 N.W.2d 651 (1956); Snodgrass v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 103 N.H. 56,
164 A.2d 579 (1960); Nelson v. A. M. Lockett & Co., 206 Okl. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952);
Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960); Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126
S.E.2d 570 (1962); Rush v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 213 Tenn. 506, 376 S.W.2d 454 (1964);
Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965); Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash.2d
345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953).
6. Prosser, supra note 3, at 881-82.
7. Black's Law Dictionary 382 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
8. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
9. 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Property § 82, at 231 (1943).
10. G. McKay, Community Property § 379, at 249 (2d. ed. 1925).
11. Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952).
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recovery for loss of consortium is important. Other jurisdictions
which deny recovery for loss of consortium but which do not have a
separate conjugal community, or the community property states that
hold loss of services equally personal to the injured spouse as loss of
society, affection, etc., do not have a separate entity to which damages for loss of services may or will be attributed. Therefore, they
may also deny recovery for this possibly substantial element of consortium.
There have been no appellate court decisions in New Mexico determining the status of the husband's action for loss of consortium
resulting from negligent injury. When the question does arise, two
courses are available to the court. They may adhere to the common
law rule providing relief only to the husband or deny recovery to the
husband as they have to the wife.
Following a review of the cases holding pro and con on the issue
presented in Roseberry, Justice Moise recognized the logical difficulties that would result should a later decision follow the common
law rule. He concluded:
It is readily apparent that the majority adhere to the rule denying
the wife a recovery. A variety of reasons are advanced for doing so.
However, none deny the logic of the writers to the effect that in our
present day society in which the wife is an equal partner with the
husband, and neither a servant nor a chattel, no discernable reason
exists for allowing the husband recovery while persisting in denying
relief to the wife. Some courts have met the problem by denying
recovery to the wife, while suggesting that the basis for allowing
recovery to the husband is outworn, and a preferable solution would
be to deny it to both .... 12
This dicta alone does not preclude the present or a future court from
reaching an opposite conclusion, however.
The equal protection clause' I also militates against adhering to
the common law rule:
Many jurisdictions upon reconsideration of the issue after the
Hitaffer decision still reiterate their earlier positions. However, one
new argument has been interjected which may force the jurisdictions
now allowing the husband's action either to grant the same action to
the wife, or deny it to both. Several courts have recently held that
the simultaneous denial of the wife's action and allowance of the
husband's constitutes a violation of the wife's rights as guaranteed
4
by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
12. Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 214, 387 P.2d 321, 324 (1963).
13. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 54 Iowa L. Rev. 510, 511 (1968).
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To allow the husband recovery, then, would require the Supreme
Court of New Mexico to either overrule Roseberry or subject the rule
announced there to renewed attack.
The obvious way out of these problems is to accept the second
alternative denying the husband recovery in cases of negligent injury
to the wife. Not only does this approach avoid the equal protection
argument and logical difficulties but has another facet to recommend
it.
An affirmative reason advanced for this approach was articulated
in Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co."' The court denied a husband's recovery for loss of consortium as "based on an outworn
theory" that allowed the husband damages for injuries to his wife in
much the same way that it allowed damages for loss or injury to one
of his domestic animals.' 6
However persuasive one may find the historical argument, it has
not gone without criticism. In fact, the same court that decided
Kronenbitter denounced its reasoning there only ten years later in
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co.
It quoted approvingly the
following language from Montgomery v. Stephan:
Her (the wife) duties and and responsibilities in respect of the family
unit complement those of the husband, extending only to another
sphere. In good times she lights the hearth with her own inimitable
glow. But when tragedy strikes it is a part of her unique glory that,
forsaking the shelter, the comfort, the warmth of her home, she puts
her arm and shoulder to the plow. We are now at the heart of the
issue. In such circumstances, when her husband's love is denied her,
'"

his strength sapped, and his protection destroyed, in short, when she

is forced by the defendant to exchange a heart for a husk, we are
urged to rule that she has suffered no loss compensable at law. 18

Yet, to afford equal treatment to the husband's action for negligently caused loss of consortium does not avoid the basic question:
Is the negligent injury to the company, cooperation, aid, affection,
society and sexual relations existing between marital partners worthy
of protection by the law? The uncertain and indefinite nature of a
wife's claim for negligent interference with her right of consortium
and the possibility of double recovery if the right is recognized,
considerations relied upon by Justice Moise, are not persuasive.
As to the uncertain and indefinite nature of the wife's claim, a
15. 4 N.Y.2d 524, 151 N.E.2d 898, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354, 3.55 (1958).

16. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 219, 229 (1953).
17. 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
18. 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234 (1960).
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distinction is made between the direct injury in case of intentional
interference and indirect injury in the case of negligence. But is this a
valid difference? Clark countered the argument very well:
What is the relevant distinction between the case where the husband's affections are alienated by the "other woman" and the case
where he becomes a human vegetable? Actually the wife is worse off
in the second case than in the first. In the first she may get a divorce
and remarry more happily. In the second she can look forward to a
lifetime as a combined nurse and breadwinner. There is the additional factor in the alienation of affections case that substantial
responsibility for the harm belongs to the husband himself, perhaps
also the wife.' 9
The problem with double recovery can be solved. The only
element for which double recovery is possible is services and earnings
and as previously noted, loss of services and earnings in New Mexico
is a community loss recoverable only by the husband acting in his
role as head of the community. 2 0 The other non-economic elements
are personal to the spouse of the injured party and not recoverable in
his separate action. However, Dean Pound expressed further reservations:
The reason for not securing the interest of wife or child in these
cases seems to be that our modes of trial are such and our mode of
assessment of damages by the verdict of a jury is necessarily so crude
that if husband and wife were each allowed to sue, instead of each
recovering an exact reparation, each would be pretty sure to recover
what would repair the injury to both.2
Wouldn't this difficulty be overcome by requiring joinder of the
claims in a single action as suggested by Judge Keating in Millington
v. Southeastern Elevator Co. ?2 2
The effects of Roseberry are to deny recovery to wives for loss of
consortium resulting from third party negligence, to seemingly
commit the New Mexico Supreme Court to the rule announced there
and to place the husband's action for loss of consortium in serious
jeopardy.
The Roseberry opinion demonstrates thorough research and consideration. So thorough that it is improbable Justice Moise was
unaware of the possible solutions to the problems posed by extending relief to the wife who has been deprived of the affection, aid,
19. Clark, supra note 2, at 277.

20. See p. 108 supra.
21. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 194
(1916).
22. 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
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company, cooperation and sexual relations of her husband through
the negligence of another. Unless greater weight was given to a need
for legislative pronouncement than is indicated by its passing
mention, 2 3 the opinion is founded primarily on reasoning which
concludes a wife's relational interests in her marriage should not be
compensable at law. This author believes the conclusion is unfortunate. It is submitted that loss of consortium is a very real personal loss to the spouse of one injured by a negligent third party and
should be afforded protection.
KESTER L. OMAN

23. Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 218, 387 P.2d 321, 327 (1963).

